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CHILDREN, AND PARENTAL INCOME 
KAREN SYMA CZAPANSKIY* 
Vaccination benefits both individuals and communities.1  Vaccinated 
people gain protection against a disease. The community benefits, because each 
vaccinated individual is one fewer person who is spreading the disease.  When a 
parent agrees to vaccinate a child, therefore, two things happen:  the child is 
protected from contracting the disease, and the child’s community gains a 
measure of protection because the child does not spread the disease.2  That 
community inevitably includes people who are too young or too fragile to be 
safely vaccinated and whose protection depends on a community of non-
spreaders, a concept called “herd immunity.”3  Vaccination has been so 
successful in eliminating communicable diseases that it has been described as 
“one of the greatest achievements” of public health in the 20th century.4 
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 1. Vaccines Protect Your Community, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (February 2020), 
https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/work/protection (showing through community immunity or herd 
immunity, people protect themselves and the community by getting vaccinated); Vaccine Basics, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (March 2020), https://www.vaccines.gov/basics 
(explaining vaccinations allow the body to fight disease more quickly and effectively).  
 2. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: 
An Ad Hoc Remedy or A Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 393 (1987) (“[C]hildren’s 
vaccines are unlike other products. Children are required by law in every state to be immunized in order 
to attend public school. The fact that state governments require children to undergo a risk in order to 
protect society as a whole, was seen by Congress as justification for development of a national fund to 
compensate children who are injured because of these risks.”) (citing to H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1, at 
4–5, as reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6344, 6344-46). 
 3. Herd Immunity and COVID-19 (coronavirus): What You Need to Know, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/in-depth/herd-immunity-and-
coronavirus/art-20486808 (last visited June 8, 2020). 
 4. Bruesewitz et al. v. Wyeth LLC, fka Wyeth, Inc., et al., 562 U.S. 22, 226 (2011) (quoting 
Achievements in Public Health 1900-1999: Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children, 
48 MORBIDITY MORTALITY WLY. REP. 243, 247 (Apr. 2, 1999)). 
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Although the parent’s decision to vaccinate a child is not always fully 
voluntary,5 the decision nonetheless deserves to be recognized and even 
celebrated by the community.  Recognition of a parent’s decision to vaccinate 
their child should include compensation in the exceptionally rare cases when a 
child suffers harm to the extent that the parent cannot continue to earn a living 
while caring for the child.  As I explain in this article, parents are not awarded 
compensation for their work or for their lost income, due to an unjustifiable 
interpretation of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (hereinafter 
“the Act”).6   
Resistance to and hesitancy about vaccinations present a risk to the public.7  
Among the most hesitant are parents deciding whether to vaccinate their 
children.8  An unvaccinated child is at risk of suffering from the disease.  Not 
vaccinating a child also threatens the health of vulnerable people in the 
community.9  This threat to the community, which was recognized by the 
Supreme Court as justification for a vaccination mandate against smallpox over 
a century ago,10 is of no less importance today in light of both the COVID-19 
 
 5. See State Vaccination Requirements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/state-reqs.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2020). Even with 
the requirement, many children are not vaccinated or are not vaccinated on time, and the result can be 
that more children experience preventable illnesses.  See Joshua Natbony & Marquita Genies, Vaccine 
Hesitancy and Refusal, 40 PEDIATRICS REV. 22, 22 (2019) (discussing how reductions in MMR 
vaccination rates resulted in “confirmed outbreaks in multiple states and more than 200 cases of measles 
across the United States” and similar experiences with the vaccine-preventable diseases of mumps and 
flu); Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/news-
room/feature-stories/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019 (last visited June 16, 2020) (“Vaccination is 
one of the most cost-effective ways of avoiding disease – it currently prevents 2-3 million deaths a year, 
and a further 1.5 million could be avoided if global coverage of vaccinations improved.”); Pam Belluck 
& Reed Abelson, Vaccine Injury Claims are Few and Far Between, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/health/vaccine-injury-claims.html (“The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention has estimated that vaccines prevented more than 21 million hospitalizations and 
732,000 deaths among children over a 20-year period.”). 
 6. National Vaccine Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 34. 
 7. Natbony & Genies, supra note 5, at 23. 
 8. See Lois A. Weithorn & Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Legal Approaches to Promoting Parental 
Compliance with Childhood Immunization Recommendations, 14 HUM. VACCINES & 
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1610 (2018); NAT’L CTR. FOR IMMUNIZATION & RESPIRATORY DISEASES, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION OF VACCINE-
PREVENTABLE DISEASES 48 (Jennifer Hamborsky et al., eds., 13th ed. 2015) (describing the need for 
public confidence in vaccinations, incidents of parental resistance and hesitancy about childhood 
vaccination, and systems for maintaining and monitoring vaccination safety); see generally Efthimios 
Parasidis, Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2153, 2162–64 (2017) (summarizing 
sources of hesitancy in parents). 
 9. Weithorn & Reiss, supra note 8, at 1610 (“[I]ncreasing numbers of parents have sought 
exemptions from vaccination requirements, which has, in turn, contributed to unprecedented increases in 
exemption rates, lower vaccination rates, and a higher risk of contracting vaccine preventable diseases”). 
 10. Id. at 1610; see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (holding that a 
Massachusetts statute mandating vaccination for smallpox was constitutional since the regulation was 
for the protection of public health and safety). 
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pandemic and repeated outbreaks of preventable and sometimes deadly 
infectious diseases such as measles, mumps, and pertussis.  
A parent’s opposition, hesitation, or resistance to vaccinating a child may 
put the parent at risk.  A parent may be subject to social shaming11 or child 
neglect proceedings.12  In rare cases, criminal prosecution may be threatened.13  
More commonly, parents may be barred from enrolling their children in school.14  
Vaccination-compliant parents face a different risk.  In a vanishingly small 
number of cases, a child may suffer long-term illness or death after receiving a 
vaccination.15  Caring for an ill or disabled child can have profound emotional 
and physical consequences for affected parents.16  Caregiving responsibilities 
may also impose a financial loss if engaging in a parent’s job or profession is 
incompatible with meeting the child’s unusual needs.17   
In this article, I argue that, as a community, we should mitigate the financial 
consequences that vaccination-compliant parents may experience, because these 
parents do the community a service by getting their child vaccinated.18  What 
stands in the way of doing that is a peculiar and unsupportable interpretation of 
the Act.  While the Act is intended to compensate for harms suffered after 
vaccination, the compensation provisions have been interpreted to exclude losses 
experienced by parents whose market participation is affected by the vaccinated 
child’s need for care.19  Two examples illustrate the problem. 
 
 11. See Jamie Wells, Want People to Get Vaccinated? Stop Shaming Them, AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. 
& HEALTH (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.acsh.org/news/2019/02/08/want-people-get-vaccinated-stop-
shaming-them-13796; see also Parasidis, supra note 8, at 2164–65. 
 12. Efthimios Parasidis & Douglas J. Opel, Parental Refusal of Childhood Vaccines and Medical 
Neglect Laws, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 68, 68 (2017).  
 13. See Weithorn & Reiss, supra note 8, at 1614. 
 14. Required Vaccines for Child Care and School, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL  & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/records/schools.html (last reviewed May 17, 2019); Weithorn & 
Reiss, supra note 8, at 1611; Diana Lambert & Daniel J. Willis, California Charter, Private Schools 
Report Lower Vaccination Rates than Traditional Public Schools, EDSOURCE (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://edsource.org/2019/california-charter-private-schools-report-lower-vaccination-rates-than-public-
schools/615871.  
 15. Belluck & Abelson, supra note 5 (“Over the past three decades, when billions of doses of 
vaccines have been given to hundreds of millions of Americans, the [Vaccine Act compensation] 
program has compensated about 6,600 people for harm they claimed was caused by vaccines. About 
70% of the awards have been settlements in cases in which program officials did not find sufficient 
evidence that vaccines were at fault.” Most claims involve adults, not children.); Elaine R. Miller et al., 
Deaths Following Vaccination: What Does the Evidence Show?, 33 VACCINE 3288, 3291 (2015) 
(although millions of vaccinations “are administered to children and adults in the United States every 
year[,] [s]erious adverse reactions are uncommon and deaths caused by vaccines are very rare”).  
 16. Impact on Families, PEDIATRIC EMOTIONAL HEALTH (last updated March 1, 2019), 
https://www.nationaljewish.org/conditions/pediatric-emotional-health/impact-on-family.  
 17. Financial Management During Crisis, KIDSHEALTH (last reviewed April 2015), 
https://kidshealth.org/en/parents/financial-crisis.html.  
 18. See Weithorn & Reiss, supra note 8, at 1610, 1613–15 (explaining that improving access to and 
incentive for vaccinations can ease the burden on vaccination-compliant parents).  
 19. See infra Sections I.A and I.B. 
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After a vaccination, Tiffany experienced seizures and central nervous 
system dysfunction.20  Her “overwhelming needs” required the fulltime care of 
a medical professional, but her parents could not afford to hire one.21  Assuming 
Tiffany’s parents were aware that reimbursement was available under the Act, 
perhaps they could have borrowed money to hire someone and repaid the loan 
with the promised reimbursement.  Claims filed after 1998, however, take an 
average of more than five years to resolve.22  Tiffany’s case, which was filed in 
2004, was not resolved until 2012.23  Tiffany’s mother left her job to provide care 
for her daughter while the case was pending.24  As part of Tiffany’s claim under 
the Act, Tiffany’s mother sought reimbursement for her lost wages.25  The 
Special Master denying the claim said that the argument in favor of 
reimbursement “has much logical and intuitive appeal,” a claim that is borne out, 
as I explain here.26  Nonetheless, the Special Master denied the claim, in 
compliance with the accepted interpretation of the statute.27   
Keith Riley contracted polio from the Oral Poliovirus Vaccine (OPV).28  He 
experienced significant permanent injuries to his legs and back, and was unable 
 
 20. Ku v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1370V, 2012 WL 6858039 at *1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 
29, 2012). The public record does not reveal the type of vaccination that Tiffany received, only that 
thimerosol was involved. Id.  Tiffany was vaccinated as an infant in either 2001 or 2002. Id. She is one 
of an extremely small group of infants who experienced a serious adverse event from which she did not 
recover. About the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), CDC WONDER, 
https://wonder.cdc.gov/vaers.html (last visited June 16, 2020). In 2001, only 142 such events were 
reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).  Id.  In 2002, there were only 132. Id. This data was 
retrieved from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) using the CDC WONDER 
Online Databases on May 19, 2020. See generally id. VAERS “contains information on unverified 
reports [received from 1990 to the present] of adverse events . . .  following immunization with US-
licensed vaccines.” Id.; see generally Parasidis, supra note 8, at 2210, 2222–28 (describing origins and 
limitations of the VAERS system and proposals for reform). 
 21. Ku, 2012 WL 6858039, at *1.  In 2011, seven years after the claim was filed, the family’s third 
request for an interim award was granted. Id. (due to Tiffany’s condition after the vaccination, Tiffany’s 
mother had to leave her job and take on the role of full-time caregiver); Wang v. Sec’y of Health & 
Hum. Servs., No. 04-1370V, 2011 WL 3806410 at *1 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 2, 2011) (granting interim award).  
 22. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 
U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1685–87 (2015). 
 23. Wang, 2011 WL 3806410 at *1 (case filed in 2004); Ku v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.  
04-1370V, 2012 WL 5914057 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 22, 2012) (case resolved in 2012). 
 24. Ku, 2012 WL 6858039, at *1.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at *2.  
 27. Id. at *4. 
 28. Riley v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-466V, 1991 WL 123583 at *1 
(Fed. Cl. June 21, 1991). Keith was vaccinated in 1989. Id. A total of thirty-four reports were made of 
serious adverse reactions to the OPV during 1989 affecting children under the age of one. About the 
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), supra note 20.  Of the thirty-four reports, probably 
less than a third involved paralytic polio.  See Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States: 
Introduction of A Sequential Vaccination Schedule of Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine Followed by Oral 
Poliovirus Vaccine; Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, 46 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1–25 (1997) (“Since 1980, an average of eight to nine cases 
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to walk without a wheelchair or crutches.29  Keith also needed braces for his 
back, legs, and ankles.30  Keith’s parents were told that “constant home physical 
therapy was the most important element in Keith’s recovery.”31  Keith’s mother 
left her employment as a tax attorney to devote herself to Keith’s recovery.  Her 
financial loss totaled nearly $200,000.32  Although Keith qualified for 
compensation under the Act, no compensation was approved for his mother.33 
This article argues that the cases interpreting the Act as denying 
compensation for the efforts of parents to care for their sick child, while 
consistent, should be overturned.  The argument has two parts.  First, the cases 
wrongly refuse to interpret the word “expenses” to permit compensation for a 
parent’s lost wages.34  Second, the narrow and unjustified interpretation of 
“expenses” should be rejected because the interpretation imposes and reinforces 
disadvantages experienced by three groups: (1) children who experience a 
disability after a vaccination, (2) mothers and fathers who are meeting a child’s 
unusual caregiving needs, and (3)  low-income families who cannot afford to hire 
substitute caregivers.  Strong public policy arguments with respect to each group 
demonstrate how the flawed interpretation of the Act is, quite simply, unfair.35  
I am not arguing that providing compensation for parents will convince 
vaccination-hesitant or resistant parents to vaccinate their children.  Hesitancy 
and resistance result from sources other than rational financial calculations.36  
My argument is that vaccination-compliant parents deserve gratitude, not 
financial punishment.  If a fair reinterpretation of the Act helps to improve trust 
in government and otherwise diminishes vaccine hesitancy or resistance, the 
result will be a happy but unintended by-product. 
 
of paralytic poliomyelitis associated with OPV has been reported annually in the United States. Vaccine-
associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) has been the only indigenous form of the disease in the 
United States since 1979.  Additional (unreported) cases of VAPP probably occur . . . the risk for VAPP 
is low (approximately one case to 2.4 million doses distributed, or one case to 750,000 children 
receiving their first dose of OPV)”); NAT’L CTR. FOR IMMUNIZATION & RESPIRATORY DISEASES, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8, at 307 (“Vaccine-associated paralytic polio is a 
rare adverse event following live oral poliovirus vaccine;” 154 cases were reported between 1980 and 
1999).  
 29. See Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *2 (explaining that as a part of Riley’s medical expenses, Riley 
had to purchase long leg braces and a scoliosis brace). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at *5. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See infra Section I.B. 
 35. See infra Section II. 
 36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.   
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I.  THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT IS PROPERLY 
INTERPRETED AS COVERING A PARENT’S LOST WAGES  
The Act is a no-fault system designed to provide compensation to people 
whose illness or injuries may be related to a vaccination and, simultaneously, to 
protect vaccine producers from unlimited liability.37  Compensation for the 
vaccinated person covers a wide range of elements, although some elements are 
capped.38  Similar to the tort system, the goal is to make the injured person 
whole,39 but compensation under the Act is secondary to other specified sources 
of assistance.40   
Compensation under the Act covers medical costs as well as “rehabilitation, 
developmental evaluation, special education, vocational training and placement, 
case management services, counseling, emotional or behavioral therapy, 
residential and custodial care and service expenses, special equipment, related 
travel expenses, and facilities determined to be reasonably necessary.”41  
Residential and custodial care expenses “shall be sufficient to enable the 
compensated person to remain living at home.”42  
A. Cases Addressing Parental Losses 
In cases where the vaccinated person is a child in the care of parents, 
compensation awards frequently address losses that parents experience along 
with the child.  What these awards recognize is that the child, whether a minor 
or an adult, does not live independently of parents.  The vaccinated child’s losses 
may affect parents, particularly in terms of their capacity to care for the 
vaccinated child.  Compensable losses, therefore, have been found to include 
both injuries directly suffered by the injured person and harms experienced by 
parents while caring for the vaccinated person.  Since the Act is understood to 
encompass compensation for harms to both child and parent, the Act should also 
 
 37. See Parasidis, supra note 8, at 2211–19 (describing procedures applicable to claims under the 
Act). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2)-(a)(4) (limiting the award for vaccine-related death and for pain and 
suffering and emotional distress for vaccine-related injury to $250,000 and setting limits on the 
calculation of lost earnings award); § 300aa-15(d) (“Compensation awarded under the Program may not 
include the following: (1) Punitive or exemplary damages. (2) Except with respect to compensation 
payments under paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a), compensation for other than the health, 
education, or welfare of the person who suffered the vaccine-related injury with respect to which the 
compensation is paid”). 
 39. Tembenis v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 733 F.3d 1190, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied 
sub nom. Tembenis v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 945 (2014). 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(g) (stating that compensation under the Act is secondary to 
compensation available “(1) under any State compensation program, under an insurance policy, or under 
any Federal or State health benefits program (other than under Title XIX of the Social Security Act), or 
(2) by an entity which provides health services on a prepaid basis”). 
 41. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A), (B). 
 42. Id. § 300aa-15(c). 
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be understood as authorizing compensation for a parent’s lost wages or for a 
parent’s caregiving time for a vaccinated child.  Nothing in the Act distinguishes 
compensation for parental work and lost opportunities from the other categories 
of permissible compensation; they are conceptually indistinct.   
For example, in an early case under the Act, the court awarded 
compensation for counseling for the vaccinated child’s parents and siblings over 
the government’s objection that family counseling is not directly for the benefit 
of the child.43  According to the court, helping the child’s family respond to the 
stress and disruption of having a disabled family member is integral to the Act’s 
compensation scheme.44  While the counseling may also benefit other family 
members:   
 
[T]he purpose of this counseling would be to assist the parents and 
children to develop a more positive, supportive atmosphere for D.J. 
… While it may appear that only incidental benefit will accrue to D.J., 
the reality is that it will be far more substantive. Inasmuch as the 
individual members of the family are adversely affected by the 
breakdown in normal familial relations, the ill effects will redound to 
D.J., further exacerbating his behavioral difficulties. Without 
intervention, the result can, and probably will be, a vicious downward 
spiral. The undersigned finds a sufficient nexus between the vaccine 
injury and the breakdown of healthy family relationships to justify an 
award for psychological counseling.45   
 
In other words, the wellbeing of a parent of a vaccinated child is within the 
purview of the Act so long as attending to the parent’s needs benefits the 
vaccinated child.  The family’s living situation provides another good example.  
In Riley, a case where the vaccinated child uses a wheelchair, the award included 
over $40,000 to allow the family to move to a handicap-accessible home.46  
Alternatives could have included moving the child into an accessible institutional 
setting or leaving the family to try to care for the child in an inaccessible setting.  
Both alternatives would violate the statutory mandate that an award for 
 
 43. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *16–17 (Fed. 
Cl. Mar. 18, 1996). 
 44. See id. at *17 (finding that a breakdown of health family relationships constituted a “sufficient 
nexus” to the vaccine injury to justify an award for psychological counseling under the Act).  
 45. Id.; see also Huber v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 255, 257 (1991) (“counseling 
that equips parents with the expertise necessary to properly manage their injured child would be an 
allowable expense”).  The Riley court came to an inconsistent conclusion when it rejected coverage of 
expenses for family counseling, which the parents sought to help equip them with expertise they lacked 
around the child’s response to his disability. Riley v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 
90-466V, 1991 WL 123583, at *3 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 1991).  
 46. Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *4. 
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residential care expenses must enable the child to live at home.47  At the same 
time, these alternatives would negatively impact the family as well as the child 
because both alternative scenarios would place an intolerable burden on the 
parent’s effort to care for the child.   
Attending to a parent’s preference about the child’s living situation is also 
important.  The Lerwick case involved Braden who became “profoundly”48 
disabled after being vaccinated as an infant and would need around-the-clock 
physical care throughout his life.49  Braden’s mother wanted the child to remain 
in her home under her care after he entered adulthood, even though the 
government’s expert was concerned that the physical demands on the mother 
could prove too great as she and the child grew older.50  The court rejected the 
government’s position that institutional care should be preferred and ordered 
compensation sufficient to honor the mother’s preference to maintain her family 
in her home.51   
Going a bit further afield, a parent’s preference about employment can give 
rise to a compensation award under the Act.  In Riley, a parent had access to 
health insurance through his employment, and a large portion of the child’s 
medical expenses could be covered by that insurance.52  Awards under the Act 
are secondary to other insurance, so the court could have ordered a reduction in 
the compensation award in recognition of the benefits that the employment-based 
insurance would provide.53  The court refused to do so on the basis, in part, that 
the parent wanted to leave the employment but could not do so because health 
insurance obtained through any other employer would probably not cover the 
child.54  By not reducing the award, the court’s decision sets a limit on the degree 
to which a parent’s choices will be constrained in order to meet the needs of the 
vaccinated child. 
A parent’s preference that the parent, and not a third party, act as the 
guardian of the vaccinated adult child has also been the subject of compensation 
 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c). 
 48. Lerwick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 06-847V, 2014 WL 3720309, at *1 (Fed. Cl. 
June 30, 2014), aff’d, 119 Fed. Cl. 745, 746 (2015) (quoting the government’s physician). 
 49. Id.  Braden’s injuries were caused by the diphtheria, tetanus, acellular pertussis (DTaP) 
vaccination administered in August 2004 when he was three months old. Lerwick v. Sec’y of Health & 
Hum. Servs., No. 06-847V, 2015 WL 1868583, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 31, 2015). During 2004, Braden 
was one of about forty-three infants under the age of six months who experienced a serious adverse 
reaction to a DTaP vaccine from which the infant did not recover.  This data was retrieved from the 
Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) using the CDC WONDER Online Databases on 
May 19, 2020. About the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), supra note 20. 
 50. Lerwick, 2014 WL 3720309, at *1–2, *17. 
 51. Id. at *13. 
 52. Riley v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-466V, 1991 WL 123583, at *3 (Fed. 
Cl. June 21, 1991). 
 53. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
 54. Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *3.  
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under the Act.  In the McCulloch case, compensation awarded to the vaccinated 
adult could not be released until the person’s mother was appointed guardian of 
the estate.55  Under state law, after the guardianship was granted, the order would 
have to be reviewed and renewed annually throughout the child’s life.56  The 
mother sought nearly $64,000 to establish and maintain the guardianship.57  The 
funds were awarded on the basis that the mother could not continue her 
involvement in caring for the child unless she was awarded the guardianship and 
had the resources to maintain the guardianship.58  The mother was not required 
to expend her own resources to obtain and exercise the guardianship, so long as 
the money was spent for a task the mother was performing for the vaccinated 
person.59 
These examples demonstrate that compensation under the Act includes 
elements that go beyond the immediate needs of the vaccinated person.  Instead, 
compensable losses include both injuries directly suffered by the injured person 
and problems experienced by parents while caring for the vaccinated person.  If 
the language of the Act is properly interpreted as including both kinds of 
compensation, then the statute should also be properly interpreted as allowing 
compensation for a parent’s lost wages or for a parent’s caregiving time for a 
vaccinated child.  The categories are conceptually indistinct.  Allowing 
compensation for only one category reflects biases that are absent from the text 
of the Act.  
B. Courts’ Interpretations of “Expenses” 
Courts that have rejected claims of parents for lost wages or compensation 
distinguish parental claims from other compensable losses by interpreting 
“expenses,” to mean a cost that is billed and paid.60  In other words, where no 
money changes hand, there is no “expense.”61  A parent’s “lost opportunity 
 
 55. McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 137 Fed. Cl. 598, 600 (2018).  
 56. Id. at 604. 
 57. Id. at 601. 
 58. Id. at 604. 
 59. Id.  
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A) (“Actual unreimbursable expenses incurred from the date of the 
judgment awarding such expenses and reasonable projected unreimbursable expenses”); §300aa-
15(a)(1)(B) (“actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of the judgment awarding such 
expenses”). 
 61. See Ku v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1370V, 2012 WL 6858039, at *1, *4 (Fed. 
Cl. Mar. 29, 2012). The mother in Ku did no paid work for eight years because the family could not 
afford to hire “someone to care for a child with T.K.’s overwhelming needs.” Id. at *1. The court 
concluded that, “[i]ntuitively, it would seem that full compensation for the family would include 
compensation for that economic loss to the family. However, such compensation simply is not provided 
by the specific provisions of Vaccine Act.” Id. at *4 (emphasis in original). See also Hocraffer v. Sec’y 
of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-533V, 2007 WL 914914, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 28, 2007) (“‘lost wages’ 
were not an expense.”); McCollum v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 86, 91 (2010), aff’d 
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costs” are distinguished from an out-of-pocket cost.62  The former are not 
compensable, while the latter are. 
One of the first cases denying parental claims about losses related to 
caregiving is Riley, where a child named Keith contracted polio shortly after 
being vaccinated for the disease.63  Keith’s pediatrician advised the parents that 
constant home physical therapy was “the most important element” in Keith’s 
recovery.64  Keith’s mother, a tax attorney, stopped working to provide Keith 
with many hours of therapy over two years.65  She sought compensation under 
the Act for her lost wages in the amount of $178,000, and the claim was denied.66 
The Act provides that compensation is available for “expenses” incurred 
before and after the judgment is entered.67  “Expenses” is not defined in the 
statute.68  The Riley court relied on a dictionary definition of “expense” to deny 
Keith’s mother’s claim.69  As is true of many dictionary definitions, the word 
expense as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary has multiple meanings.70  The 
Riley court, without explanation, focused only on one: “[t]hat which is expended, 
laid out or consumed. An outlay; charge; cost; price.”71  Based on that quotation, 
the court concluded that the foregone wages were not an incurred expense 
because nothing was “paid out.”72   
While the court did not identify which edition of Black’s provided the 
definition, the latest possible edition in print at the time of the decision was the 
sixth edition, published in 1990, a year before the Riley decision.  In that edition, 
 
per curiam, 412 Fed. Appx. 307, 308 (2011) (denying the father’s claim to recover lost income from 
leaving his job to care for his child)); Edgar v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 286, 292 
(1992), vacated on other grounds, 989 F.2d 473, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Riley v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health 
& Hum. Servs., No. 90-466V, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 1991). 
 62. Ku, 2012 WL 6859039, at *3–4; see also Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 (finding that a parent’s 
lost wages is not an “incurred” expense).  
 63. Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *1. 
 64. Id. at *5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15. 
 69. Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 n.7. The second and third sources relied upon by the Riley court 
were two cases decided under the Act.  One is Stotts v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum, Servs., a 1990 
decision about the meaning of the word expenses as used in the legislative history pertaining to a 
different section of the Act. No. 89-108V, 1990 WL 293856, at *1 (Cl. Ct. Oct. 11, 1990).  All that the 
Stotts court decided was that an award for pain and suffering may be different from an expense but that 
the distinction is not determinative; the question of whether the word expense includes or excludes a lost 
opportunity to earn wages was not before the court. Id. at *16. The other case is Wasson v. Sec’y of 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., in which the word expenses was discussed in terms of how much should 
be allowed for expert witness fees. 24 Cl. Ct. 482 (Cl. Ct. 1991). That decision too says nothing about 
whether a lost opportunity to earn wages is or is not an expense. Id. 
 70. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 71. Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 n.7.  
 72. Id.  
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the definition of expense includes the language quoted by the court.73  The rest 
of the definition, omitted by the court, does not limit the word to something 
which is paid out.  Other conduct is also included within the term: “[t]he 
expenditure of money, time, labor, resources, and thought.  That which is 
expended in order to secure benefit or bring about a result.”74   
A lost opportunity to earn wages is an expenditure of time, and Mrs. Riley 
used her time to secure a benefit for her son through her hands-on care rather 
than through her paycheck.75  Nothing in the full definition, in other words, 
excludes Mrs. Riley’s lost wages from being recognized as a proper subject for 
compensation.  Only the truncated version of the definition used in Riley 
precludes seeing her lost wages as an “expense.”76 
This issue arose again in Hocraffer,77 where a child experienced a mild case 
of Reye’s Syndrome after a vaccination.  The court denied compensation to the 
child’s mother for her time away from work while caring for the child.78  In the 
court’s view, an expense is “something paid out to attain a goal or accomplish a 
purpose,” and not a lost opportunity.79  The American Heritage Dictionary relied 
on by the Hocraffer court, like the Black’s relied on in Riley, does not limit its 
definition of the word expense to something paid out.80  It does just the opposite, 
as recognized in a Texas appellate case: “Similar to ‘cost,’ the term ‘expense’ 
has both narrow and broad meanings.81  ‘Expense’ means either ‘[s]omething 
 
 73. See infra note 74. 
 74. Expense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). Two earlier editions of Black’s Law 
Dictionary use similarly inclusive language.  See Expense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) 
(“[t]hat which is expended, laid out or consumed; an outlay; charge; cost; price . . . the expenditure of 
time, labor, and thought; the employment and consumption of time and labor . . . laying out or 
expending of money or other resources, as time or strength.”); Expense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th 
ed. 1979) (“[t]hat which is expended, laid out or consumed . . . The expenditure of money, time, labor, 
resources, and thought.”).   
 75. See Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 (explaining that Mrs. Riley believed that she had to “forego 
her legal career and devote herself” to her son’s recovery).  
 76. The next reported case in which a parent’s claim for lost wages was considered is Edgar v. 
Sec’y of Health & Hum, Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 286 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 989 F.2d 473, 477 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) which deemed a claim for parents’ lost wages “questionable” but not providing 
analysis. 
 77. Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-533V, 2007 WL 914914, at *1 (Fed. Cl. 
Feb. 28, 2007), rev’d in part on other grounds, No. 99-533V, 2007 WL 5180525 (Fed. Cl. July 13, 
2007).  
 78. Id. at *8–9. 
 79. Id. at *8. The Hocraffer court cites Warner for this proposition, a case which interprets the 
word expense as it appears in a different section of the Act.  Warner v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 
No. 92-0201V, 1992 WL 405286, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 29, 1992) (citing Expense, AM. HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1985)).  
 80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 81. Glidden Co. v. CDNE, Inc., No. 12-09-00283-CV, 2011 WL 686286, at *4 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Feb. 28, 2011). 
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paid out . . . to accomplish a purpose’ or ‘[s]omething given up for the sake of 
something else’ or ‘sacrifice.’” 82 
Neither Riley nor Hocraffer offers an explanation about why one definition 
should be preferred over another.  In 2019, the United States Supreme Court 
decided a case that turned on whether the word “expense” included fees for the 
government’s attorneys in the context of a cost-shifting provision under the 
Patent Act.83  In denying the government’s claim, the Court emphasized that the 
dictionary definition of expenses “provide[s] scant guidance” because the term 
“encompasses wide-ranging ‘expenditure[s] of money, time, labor, or resources 
to accomplish a result.’”84  Choosing one part of a definition over another cannot 
be done randomly; instead, the choice must be consistent with the use of the word 
in the context of the statute.85 
In the context of the Act, limiting the word expense to mean monetary 
outlays is inconsistent with the compensation scheme of the statute.86  Family 
involvement in caring for the vaccinated child, whether the child is a minor or an 
adult, is integral to the compensation scheme.  Importantly, the statute mandates 
that home-based caregiving is to be preferred over other care plans, regardless of 
cost.87  Nothing in the statute expressly precludes compensation for parents who 
undertake unusual caregiving efforts to meet the needs of a vaccinated child.88  
As discussed earlier, compensation awards routinely include elements that help 
parents of minor and adult children ensure that they can provide care at home.89 
C. Courts’ Interpretation of Compensation for Parental Care  
McCollum provides a second argument justifying the denial of 
compensation to parents who provide an unusual level of care to a vaccinated 
child: parents should not be paid to do what parents are supposed to do.90  In 
McCollum, a three-month-old child named Grant developed a seizure disorder 
and brain abnormalities after receiving a vaccination.91  The compensation award 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Peter v. Nantkwest, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 365 (2019). 
 84. Id. at 372 (quoting Expenses, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 85. See id. (holding that “[r]eading the term “expenses” alongside neighboring words in the 
statute. . . supports a conclusion excluding legal fees from the scope of” the statute). 
 86. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 87. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c) (“The amount of any compensation for residential and custodial 
care and service expenses under subsection (a)(1) shall be sufficient to enable the compensated person to 
remain living at home.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra notes 42, 46, 50 and accompanying text. 
 90. McCollum v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 86, 91-92 (2010), aff’d per curiam, 
412 Fed.Appx. 307 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 91. Id. at 87. During 1992, Grant was one of about 125 infants under the age of six months who 
experienced a serious adverse reaction to a DPT vaccine from which the infant did not recover. About 
the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), supra note 20.   
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under the Act contemplated that Grant would eventually leave home to enter 
residential care.92  Over the years, however, Grant’s health deteriorated, and 
residential care became inappropriate.93  Grant’s parents proposed a revised plan 
under which Grant would remain at home, and Grant’s father would retire so he 
could provide a large percentage of the care that would otherwise be provided by 
a home health care aide.94  The proposal included funding for Grant’s father 
which was  characterized as both a replacement for the father’s lost wages and a 
salary for the father who acted as Grant’s home health aide.95  
Shortly before Grant’s eighteenth birthday, the Special Master denied the 
motions.96  In its review of the Special Master’s decision, the Court of Federal 
Claims agreed that compensation under the Act does not include compensation 
for the parents of the vaccinated child.97  The court relied on the earlier caselaw 
that excludes lost wages from the definition of expense.98  The court also 
concluded that Grant’s father’s request “in essence, asks the Federal Government 
to pay Mr. McCollum to care for his son.”99  Under the Act, the court reasoned 
that parents bear the primary duty of caring for their children.100  The Act 
supports a preference for caring for a child at home rather than “forc[ing] young 
children to be institutionalized”; but nothing in the Act “exempt[s] parents from 
caring for their children.”101  In sum, the Act “does not permit Mr. McCollum to 
be paid for fulfilling his duties as a parent, regardless of how difficult that may 
be.”102 
As a formal matter, whether the court is correct in asserting that Mr. 
McCollum owes the usual parental duties to Grant is questionable.  At the time 
of the decision, Grant was about to enter adulthood.103  Generally, the legal duty 
of parents to support their children ends at that time,104 although  many parents 
 
 92. McCollum, 91 Fed. Cl. at 88. 
 93. Id. at 88, 89. 
 94. Id. at 89. 
 95. Id. at 89, 91. 
 96. See id. at 87, 89 (clarifying the Grant was born on April 21, 1992 and that the Special Master 
denied the petitioners’ motion on July 27, 2009). 
 97. Id. at 92. 
 98. Id. at 91 n.10. 
 99. Id. at 92. 
 100. See id. (clarifying that while “[h]ome attendant care provides assistance to parents and gives 
them some relief from the constant needs of an injured child, . . . [h]ome attendant care does not . . . 
exempt parents from caring for their own children.”).  
 101. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c).  
 102. McCollum, 91 Fed. Cl. at 92. 
 103. Id. at 87; see infra note 104. 
 104. See, e.g., IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW:  CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 505 (5th ed. 
2010) (stating that the duty of a parent to provide financial support to an adult disabled child is available 
in many states as an exception to the usual rule that the duty of child support ends at eighteen); accord 
Jeffrey W. Childers, Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Continued Parental Support of 
Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in North Carolina, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2094, 2095 (2002) 
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help their adult children out of a sense of moral duty.105  A legal duty is imposed 
in most states as to adult children who are disabled,106 but the exception imposes 
only a financial duty of support, not a duty to provide a home and caregiving.107  
Further, most adult children are self-sufficient, so daily parental physical care is 
unnecessary.  Grant had continuing caregiving needs solely because his parents 
had done what the public health requires: agreed to vaccinate him.108  
The McCollum court also found support in the House Report on the Act, 
but the excerpt the court relied on is, at best, ambiguous.109  The excerpt 
addresses the question of whether compensation should be provided for home 
care if institutionalization is an available option.110  According to the Report, 
Congress intended for the decision to be made by the vaccinated person and 
family, not by the government.111  More importantly, Congress intended that the 
decision not be governed by cost.112  If the choice is made to care for the person 
at home, the Act is described in the Report as providing for “in-home medical, 
rehabilitative, and custodial care, and such modifications to existing physical 
facilities (such as bathroom facilities) as are necessary to ensure that injured 
persons are not required to be institutionalized for purely economic reasons.”113  
 
(stating that “[h]istorically, most jurisdictions . . . have followed the common law rule that parents are 
not obligated to support their adult children.”); accord Katherine Ellis Reeves, Post-Majority Child 
Support Awards for Disabled Children: A Fifty State Survey, 8 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 109, 
109 (2008) (explaining the significance of the “common-law rule that a parent cannot be compelled to 
financially support his or her child after he or she reaches the age of majority.”).  
 105. See Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
710, 721 (2007) (“[O]nly nine states follow the traditional common law rule that a parent’s duty to 
support his or her child ends once that child reaches majority or is otherwise emancipated.”). 
 106. Id. at 723–24. 
 107. See Corby v. McCarthy, 840 A.2d 188, 219 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (“We have not been 
provided with any authority to suggest that the court was entitled to require [mother] … to reside with 
[adult disabled child]. Although the applicable statute contemplates financial support for a 
destitute adult child, … it does not compel a parent physically to reside with such a child.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 108. See McCollum v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 86, 87 (2012), aff’d per curiam, 
412 Fed. Appx. 307 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that after receiving a DPT vaccine, Grant was 
“diagnosed with a seizure disorder and various brain abnormalities.”). 
 109. See id. at 92 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 21 (1986)).  
 110. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 21 (1986) (“Any compensation award for residential and 
custodial care and service expenses is to be sufficient to allow the compensated person to remain living 
at home. This provision is not intended to prevent injured persons from receiving appropriate 
institutional care if they and their families request such services; neither is it intended to provide for the 
payment of family living expenses, the purchase of a home, or the construction of a major addition. The 
Committee intends that this provision allow for in-home medical, rehabilitative, and custodial care, and 
such modifications to existing physical facilities (such as bathroom facilities) as are necessary to ensure 
that injured persons are not required to be institutionalized for purely economic reasons.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 20 (“The Committee recognizes that injured children often have special or unusual 
health care and education needs and has attempted to provide flexibility in compensation awards by its 
broad description of compensable care.”). 
 113. Id. at 21. 
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At the same time, the Act precludes “payment of family living expenses, the 
purchase of a home, or the construction of a major addition.”114 
The McCollum court relied on the House Report’s language about 
precluding the payment of “family living expenses” in denying Grant’s father’s 
demand.115 The quoted language, however, does not address whether 
compensation is permissible for a parent who is providing care in a way not 
normally provided by parents. The language also fails to address the situation of 
a parent who could combine caregiving with paid labor until the child’s 
caregiving needs required more time and attention.  Mr. McCollum, for example, 
was offering to provide home care for his adult child, which is beyond the scope 
of usual parental duties as well as inconsistent with his earlier practice of 
combining caregiving with paid labor.116  Similarly, in Riley, Mrs. Riley was 
providing many hours a day of physical therapy to her child, which is something 
that parents are rarely called upon to do.117  By foregoing her occupation to 
respond to her child’s exceptional needs, Mrs. Riley became an exception 
herself, because nearly all parents – including a majority of those with a disabled 
child – engage in both caregiving and paid labor.118   
When read in context, the term “family living expenses” could cover 
indirect as well as direct costs that bear on a parent’s decision to care for a child 
at home. 119  Understanding what motivates parents to choose institutionalization 
over custodial care at home is essential.  Direct expenses, such as medical care 
and equipment and home modifications are plainly covered by the Act.120 
Therefore, parental decisions about institutionalization should not turn on those 
considerations.  Denial of compensation for indirect costs, however, can also 
burden a parental decision about whether a child should be institutionalized.  
Foremost among the indirect costs is the loss of parental income if a parent, 
usually a mother, leaves the labor force or reduces labor force participation in 
order to provide the unusual degree of care that the child needs because of the 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. McCollum v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 86, 92 (2010), aff’d per curiam, 412 
Fed. Appx. 307 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 116. Id. at 91. 
 117. Riley v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-466V, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 (Fed. 
Cl. June 21, 1991). 
 118. Id.; see also DENNIS HOGAN, FAMILY CONSEQUENCES OF CHILDREN’S DISABILITIES 39 
(Russell Sage Foundation 2012) (reporting that most mothers, even those who have children with 
disabilities, “eventually return to paid employment and work during a substantial portion of their 
children’s lives.”). 
 119. See Mark Stabile & Sara Allin, The Economic Costs of Childhood Disability, 22 FUTURE 
CHILD. 65, 69 (2012) (“Direct monetary costs include expenditures on health care, therapeutic, 
behavioral, or educational services; transportation; caregivers; and other special needs services. Indirect 
costs consist primarily of reductions in parents’ ability to sustain paid employment.”).  
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c). 
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vaccination injury.121  The likelihood that a mother of a disabled child works for 
pay is three to eleven percentage points less than other mothers.122  Where a child 
is severely disabled, the likelihood that the mother works for pay is thirteen to 
fifteen percentage points less than other mothers.123  Reduced labor force 
participation because of the child’s unusual needs costs a family, on average and 
in 2011 dollars, $3,150 a year, with a range of $1,050 to $7,000.124  Pure financial 
rationality, in other words, could push a family to choose institutionalization over 
custodial care at home, which directly contradicts congressional intent as 
described in the statute’s guarantee that compensation “shall be sufficient to 
enable the compensated person to remain living at home.”125  Further, this is 
counter to the full message of the sole congressional report addressing the 
statute’s compensation language.126 
In concluding that the Act precludes paying parents to care for their 
children, the McCollum court is drawing a distinction between damages under 
the Act and damages typically available in tort law for the healthcare services a 
child receives from their parent.  The usual rule, however, is that “the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover the reasonable value of such services.”127  Generally, damages 
are available in tort where the child’s caregiving needs exceed those of a child 
who has not been injured.128  The amount of damages is usually tied to the 
reasonable value of the services, so the plaintiff recovers the value of nursing 
 
 121. Stabile & Allin, supra note 119, at 68–69, 75. 
 122. Id. at 72. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 84 tbl.1. 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c); see generally Lerwick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 06-
847V, 2014 WL 3720309, at *14 (Fed. Cl. June 30, 2014), aff’d, 119 Fed. Cl. 745 (2015) (interpreting 
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c) to demonstrate Congressional preference for home care).  
 126. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 21 (1986). 
 127. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES pt. 2, § 7:11 (3d ed. 1997); see Roberts 
v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 452 (Me. 1980); J. A. Connelly, Annotation, Damages for Personal Injury or 
Death as Including Value of Care and Nursing Gratuitously Rendered, 90 A.L.R.2d 1323 § 5(a) (1963); 
FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.22 (2d ed. 
1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 128. Haley Hermanson, The Right Recovery for Wrongful Birth, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 559 (2019); 
see Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) (finding that “[s]pecial kinds of expenditures or 
sacrifices . . . which exceed the ordinary manner of rearing a child” is relevant in awarding damages to 
parents). 
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services provided by a parent.129  Some courts go further, however, and allow the 
value to be established based on the wages lost by the parent.130  
If the rule generally applicable in tort cases were applied in the McCollum 
case, a compensation award would have included at least the wages that Grant’s 
father requested, in the same amount paid to anyone else providing the same 
services to Grant.131  In the Ku case, an award equivalent to the wages of a skilled 
home healthcare provider might have been equivalent to the mother’s lost 
wages.132  In the Riley case, however, the only way to make the family whole 
would be to include the mother’s lost wages in the compensation award, as is 
permitted in a minority of cases.133  Compensating the family at the rate paid to 
a physical therapist aide would deprive the family of the much greater amount 
that the mother was earning as a tax attorney.134 
 
 129. See, e.g., Laughner v. Bryne, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Worley v. Bargar, 
807 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (while “it is reasonably foreseeable that an injury to a minor 
child would result in his or her parent expending time in caring for the child and that there is a sufficient 
likelihood of the parent suffering pecuniary injury . . . [t]he consequence of placing the burden on the 
defendant to pay the reasonable value of the services rendered to the minor child by the parent is no 
greater than if the expense had been incurred in employing a third person to deliver the service. We 
decline plaintiff’s request for lost wages because it would insert a level of foreseeability that is not 
necessary in order for plaintiff to receive a reasonable recovery for the care of the minor child.”); 
Roberts v. Tardiff, 417 A.2d 444, 452 (Me. 1980); Hamlin v. N.H. Bragg & Sons, 151 A. 197, 199 (Me. 
1930); Armstrong v. ONufrock, 341 P.2d 105, 107 (Nev. 1959). 
 130. See, e.g., Worley, 807 N.E.2d at 1227 (citing Lester v. Dunn, 475 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); 
Fields v. Graff, 784 F. Supp. 224, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1992); 130 AM. JUR. TRIALS 447 § 13 (2013 & Supp. 
2020); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in Torts Course, 1 YALE J. 
L. & FEMINISM 41, 53–54 (1989) (“A closely related damages issue arises when a family member is 
injured and requires home care, and a female member of the family provides that care at the cost of 
leaving paid work outside the home. Using stereotyped notions about woman’s ‘natural’ caretaking role 
and nurturing sensibilities, some courts and commentators have characterized this care as gratuitous, and 
thus not compensable unless actual expenditures have been made. … The idea that a woman renders 
caretaking services out of love and devotion as part of her natural role precludes recognition of the 
woman’s economic and personal sacrifice… [E]ven if a woman gives up wages earned in employment 
outside the home, the measure of damages frequently is only the court’s assessment of the value of the 
home care, rather than the value of the wages foregone by the woman, despite the obvious importance of 
those wages at a time when another family earner is disabled.”); Haley Hermanson, The Right Recovery 
for Wrongful Birth, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 559 (2019). 
 131. McCollum v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 86 (2010), aff’d per curiam, 412 
Fed.Appx. 307 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 132. Ku v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1370V, 2012 WL 6858039 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 29, 
2012). No exact figure is provided in the case reports about the wages lost when Tiffany Ku’s mother 
stopped working to provide her with fulltime care. See id. Assuming that the mother was in a relatively 
low-paid job, the lost wage might have been comparable to that paid to a home health aide. Id. In 2003, 
the median annual salary of home health aides was $18,200.00. KIM SOLOMON ET AL., DEFINING THE 
FRONTLINE WORKFORCE 28 tbl.5 (2005). Tiffany was vaccinated as an infant, so compensation based on 
the mother’s caregiving prior to the compensation award and continuing, at minimum, until Tiffany 
reached adulthood, would total $327,600.00. See id.; see also Ku, 2012 WL 6879061, at 7. 
 133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.   
 134. In the Riley case, for example, Mrs. Riley left work as a tax attorney so she could provide 
physical therapy to her child many hours a day for two years. Riley v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & 
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Several kinds of damage awards that are usually available in civil litigation 
are not available or are restricted under the Act.  Notably, claimants under the 
Act cannot be awarded punitive damages, and awards for pain and suffering and 
for wrongful death are capped.135  The fact that nothing in the Act expressly 
precludes an award to a parent for time spent caring for a child is significant, 
therefore, since Congress demonstrated knowledge of how to preclude or limit 
specific forms of tort damages.  Further, as the Court of Federal Claims said in a 
decision denying a claim for lost income for a minor child who died before the 
compensation award was entered, the preferred interpretation under the Act is 
for results that are consistent with awards under state tort law.136  
II.  DENYING COMPENSATION TO CAREGIVING PARENTS OF A VACCINATED 
CHILD IS UNJUSTIFIED 
Multiple groups of people are disadvantaged because the Act has been 
misinterpreted to deny parents compensation for lost wages.  Primary among 
these groups are (1) children who experience a disability after a vaccination, (2) 
mothers and fathers who are meeting a child’s unusual levels of caregiving needs, 
and (3) parents who cannot afford to hire substitute caregivers.  Legitimate 
claims for equity as to each of these vulnerable groups demonstrate how the 
flawed interpretation of the Act is inconsistent with public policy.137   
 
Hum. Servs., No. 90-466V, 1991 WL 123583, at *5 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 1991). In 2003, the median 
annual salary of a physical therapy aide was $21,070, which yields an average hourly rate of $10.13 
(21,070/2080). SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 132, at 27 tbl. 4.  If Mrs. Riley is providing therapy for four 
hours a day, 365 days a year for two years, she “earned” $29,580.00. Riley, 1991 WL 123583, at *5. 
That is less than 20% of the lost wages but considerably more than zero.  SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 
132, at 27 tbl.4. Tiffany Ku’s mother was providing her with fulltime care. Ku, 2012 WL 6879061, at *7 
n.10.  In 2003, the median annual salary of home health aides was $18,200.00.  SOLOMON ET AL., supra 
note 132, at 28 tbl.5.  Tiffany was vaccinated as an infant, so compensation based on the mother’s 
caregiving prior to the compensation award and continuing, at minimum, until Tiffany reached 
adulthood, would total $327,600.00.  Ku, 2012 WL 6879061, at *7.  
 135. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(2)–(4) (limiting the award for vaccine-related death and for pain and 
suffering and emotional distress for vaccine-related injury to $250,000; placing limits on calculation of 
lost earnings award); § 300aa-15(d) (“Compensation awarded under the Program may not include the 
following: (1) Punitive or exemplary damages. (2) Except with respect to compensation payments under 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a), compensation for other than the health, education, or welfare of 
the person who suffered the vaccine-related injury with respect to which the compensation is paid”). 
 136. See Tembenis v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 733 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied sub nom. Tembenis v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 945 (2014) (justifying analysis, in part, on consistency 
between result under the Act and result under state tort law).   
 137. AARP FAM. CAREGIVING, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 9 
(2020), https://www.caregiving.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/AARP1316_RPT_CaregivingintheUS_WEB.pdf (explaining that in 2020, 
approximately 14.1 million adults in the United States are providing unpaid care for a child with special 
needs, an increase of nearly four million since 2015).   
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A.  Disability 
The Act can be viewed as a celebration of health rather than as a response 
to disability because a core purpose of the Act is to prevent death and disability 
by protecting the supply of vaccines that prevent people from getting deadly and 
disabling diseases.138  The other purpose, compensating people who experience 
poor health after a vaccination, inevitably involves disability.139  Disability 
theory, I argue, suggests that denying compensation for the parent’s lost wages 
denies justice to the disabled person, not just the parent-caregiver.   
Professor Samuel Bagenstos argues that disability rights must be grounded 
in a claim for justice, which he describes this way:  
 
People with disabilities deserve to be treated as full and equal 
participants because it is the just thing to do. Basic principles of 
equality should be understood to prohibit societal decisions that attach 
disadvantage to stigmatized group statuses.  And, even if total 
monetary costs exceed the monetizable benefits, those of us “who 
have a choice between participating in a subordinating system and 
working (at reasonable cost) against such a system have a moral 
obligation to respond in a way that reduces subordination.”140 
 
A common way to understand disability is the social model under which 
the focus is not on the mental or physical situation of the person with a disability 
but on the social environment in which the person lives and the dynamic interface 
between the two.141  In many situations, the social environment can be altered in 
such a way that the experience of the person with a disability is no different from 
the experience of everyone else in the environment.  For example, a person who 
uses a wheelchair can go from one floor to another if the building has ramps or 
an elevator.  If the building only has steps, however, the person in the wheelchair 
experiences a mobility barrier. 
Equity for a child who is disabled after a vaccination requires the same 
inclusive approach.  All children require care from a parent or from someone 
who is willing to fulfill the caregiving role of a parent, but not all children require 
the same number of hours of care over many years or the same level of medical 
expertise.  Children claiming under the Act experience a wide variety of 
disabilities affecting their general health, mobility, cognition, behavior, and 
development.  If a parent can provide care directly or can intervene on behalf of 
 
 138. See Parasidis, supra note 8, at 2209–11.  
 139. Id. at 2210.  
 140. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability Rights and the Discourse of Justice, 73 SMU L. REV. F. 26, 
33-34 (2020) (quoting Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 838 (2003)). 
 141. Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, Welfare Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2483, 2484–85 (2011). 
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the child to secure needed services, some of these children will get the chance to 
thrive or, at minimum, avoid greater loss up to, and including, death.   
Using the social model to understand vaccine-related disability helps to 
make sense of what the parent’s effort means for the child.  If the parent is 
enabled to spend more time with and attention on the child, the child’s medical 
fragility, developmental delays, or mobility limitations may have less impact on 
the child’s capacity to learn, to interact with others, or to enjoy life.  More 
parental time and attention could open the door to the child having a life that is 
comparable to the life enjoyed by other children whose needs are less substantial.  
The child’s claim for justice, in other words, has an impact on the child’s family.  
Fairness for the child is advanced by fairness for the child’s parents. 
The Riley case provides a vivid example of how increased parental time and 
attention can ensure that a child with unusual caregiving needs enjoys the same 
chances in life that average parents provide for their children while combining 
paid work with usual levels of caregiving.  Keith’s need for many hours of 
physical therapy a day required Keith’s parents to make a choice: both could 
continue to earn their salaries, or one could sacrifice a salary to provide Keith 
with therapy.142  They chose the latter, which meant that Keith got more hours 
of physical therapy.143  Keith’s family, however, paid the price of the loss of 
nearly $200,000 in income over two years, a sum that had to affect the long-term 
financial well-being of the family.144  The substitute income that should have 
been provided under the Act would have ensured that Keith could have access to 
appropriate parental resources while protecting Keith’s family from the financial 
loss.   
B.  Vulnerability 
Professor Martha Fineman argues that legal thinkers must respond to the 
inevitable vulnerability that is part and parcel of the human experience.145  A 
responsive state, in her view, “recognizes the universality and constancy of 
vulnerability, as well as the need for providing mechanisms for building 
resilience.”146  “Resilience is what provides an individual with the means and 
ability to recover from harm or setbacks,” and “[t]he degree of resilience an 
 
 142. Bagenstos, supra note 140, at 33–34.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.; see also Julie L. Hotchkiss & M. Melinda Pitts, The Role of Labor Market Intermittency in 
Explaining Gender Wage Differentials, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 417 (2007) (examining the impact on 
women’s lifetime earnings of intermittent market labor). 
 145. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY, AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 4 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 
2017). 
 146. Id. 
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individual has is largely dependent on the quality and quantity of resources . . .  
that they have at their disposal or command.”147 
Vulnerability can be experienced by society broadly as well as by 
individuals; the Act responds at both levels.  When an infectious disease cannot 
be prevented or treated, everyone is vulnerable, as has been made plain by 
COVID-19.  The first purpose of the Act is to respond to societal vulnerability 
by insulating pharmaceutical companies from liability to encourage them to 
invest in vaccine development.148 When vaccine development succeeds, most 
people never experience the illness or its disabling and deadly consequences.149  
A few people may get ill because of the vaccine, however, and a few may die.150  
The second purpose of the Act is to respond to the vulnerability of these 
individuals who are vaccinated for the good of the whole but whose opportunity 
for compensation from vaccine manufacturers is curtailed under the Act.151  The 
two purposes do not have an impermeable dividing line.  If all goes well with a 
vaccine, enough people accept vaccination for themselves and their children to 
provide herd immunity for those who are too vulnerable for vaccination.  Fair 
treatment of those injured by vaccination, including just compensation, offers a 
limited response.  
In terms of vulnerability theory, compensation under the Act should support 
an opportunity for resilience for the few people who suffer harm after a 
vaccination.  Obviously, the opportunity for resilience requires access to medical 
treatment, rehabilitation and other support, all of which are provided under the 
Act.  Denying compensation for the financial losses suffered by caretaking 
parents, however, means that the response is incomplete, at least to the extent 
that opportunities for resilience depend on parental caregiving.  The vaccinated 
child, or the “vulnerable subject” in Fineman’s terms, loses opportunities for 
resilience, “the essential, but incomplete antidote to our vulnerability,” when the 
child’s parent cannot afford to be present to help the child recover and develop.152 
If parents sacrifice income to provide family care for the child, the family’s 
resources may be inadequate to secure what the child needs in order to thrive.  
The Act promises reimbursement for the cost of hiring help or for 
 
 147. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Limits of Equality: Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 73, 86–87 (Robin West & Cynthia Grant Bowman 
eds., 2019). 
 148. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 2, at 394 (“Congress set out to achieve two objectives: 
to provide an expeditious method of compensating children who are injured because of vaccines and to 
make liability for vaccine manufacturers more predictable so that the supply of vaccines in the United 
States will be adequate.”). 
 149. See Parasidis, supra note 8, at 2222.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 2219.  
 152. Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 307, 320 (2014). 
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institutionalization, but both may be an inferior alternative.  Parents who can 
provide care for the child may have the incentive to do a better job than a hired 
caregiver.  The parents and the child may prefer parental care rather than being 
dependent on people who may have less investment in the child’s capacity to 
thrive, or even in the child’s survival.  Both negative scenarios are avoided, or at 
least mitigated, by a compensation scheme which allows parents to be 
compensated for the costs they incur and income they lose when devoting 
themselves to supporting the resilience of their vulnerable child.153   
C.  Lower Income Families 
Because the Act is misinterpreted as denying compensation for the 
economic consequences suffered by caregiving parents, the economic value of 
the Act to many families depends on whether the family enjoys higher or lower 
income at the time the child is vaccinated.  This occurs because wages paid to a 
substitute caregiver are compensable under the Act, but the lost wages of the 
parent are not.154  Higher income parents and parents with higher levels of 
education are more likely to maintain their employment while caring for a 
disabled child, in part, because they can afford to hire substitute care for the child 
at home.155 In this regard, Riley presents a highly unusual scenario where a high-
income parent leaves work to provide care for a child.156  The cost of the 
substitute caregiver is reimbursed under the current interpretation of the Act.157  
If a family lacks the money to pay for a substitute caregiver or cannot afford to 
wait years for reimbursement of the money paid to the substitute caregiver,158 
one of the parents, usually the mother, stays home to care for the child.159  Unlike 
wages paid to a substitute caregiver, the parent’s lost income is not reimbursable 
under the current interpretation of the Act.  
In the average American family, married mothers who are employed 
fulltime outside the home spend 9.24 hours in an average week caring for 
children in their household, while married fathers with fulltime employment 
 
 153. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 213–17 (1995) (explaining the costs associated with motherhood and 
suggesting policy reforms to encourage effective mothering); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking 
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2181–209 (1995); see 
generally Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, in NUSSBAUM AND LAW (Robin West ed., 
2015); see also Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2007).   
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a). 
 155. See HOGAN, supra note 118, at 39. 
 156. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.  
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a).  
 158. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text. 
 159. See HOGAN, supra note 118, at 37–39. 
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spend, on average, 6.23 hours weekly.160  Although not without stress, most 
parents combine the roles of homemaker and provider.161  Whether the family 
includes two parents or one, the mother’s income is often essential.162  Indeed, 
increased workforce participation by women accounts for most of the increase in 
household income in recent decades.163  Interruptions in workforce participation 
to care for a family member can depress the family’s financial well-being in the 
short term because of the loss of a paycheck and in the long term because 
interruptions affect women’s pay even after they return to work.164  
The economic life of parents whose children have a disability is commonly 
worse than that of parents of other children.  Many report spending time 
equivalent to full-time employment providing care for the child, ranging from 
feeding and toileting to therapy and medication to interacting with medical, 
therapeutic, and educational providers.165  The stress on these parents who are 
trying to combine paid work with childrearing exceeds that of other parents.166  
A quarter of unpaid adult caregivers for children experience ill health, a third 
report the caregiving situation to be “emotionally stressful,” and nearly two-
thirds report that caregiving “limits the time they spend with other family and 
 
 160. American Time Use Survey, BUREAU LAB. STATS. tbl.A-6A (2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/tus/tables/a6-1317.htm (“Time spent in primary activities and the percent of 
married mothers and fathers who did the activities on an average day by employment status, average for 
the combined years 2013-17: Own household child under age 18”).  
 161. See Press Release, Bureau Lab. Stats., Employment Characteristics of Families – 2019, 2 (Apr, 
21, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/famee.pdf (“Among married-couple families with 
children, 97.5 percent had at least one employed parent in 2019, and 64.2 percent had both parents 
employed”). 
 162. See Isabel V. Sawhill & Katherine Guyot, Women’s Work Boosts Middle-Class Incomes but 
Creates a Family Time Squeeze That Needs to be Eased, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 5 (May 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/essay/womens-work-boosts-middle-class-incomes-but-creates-a-family-
time-squeeze-that-needs-to-be-eased/ (“Over 40 percent of all mothers are either the sole or the primary 
breadwinners for their families. This includes many who are single parents but also a rising number in 
two-paycheck families where the wife earns more than her husband”; two-earner families now account 
for 70% of all families). 
 163. See id. (“By our estimates, based on a method initially proposed by Heather Boushey at the 
Center for Equitable Growth and using pre-tax money income in the Current Population Survey, average 
middle-class household income grew from $57,420 in 1979 to $69,559 in 2018. If the average 
contribution of women to household income had not changed, most of these gains would not have been 
seen. Average income would have increased to just $58,502 in 2018. Women therefore accounted for 91 
percent of the total income gain for their families.”). 
 164. See id.; Markus Gangl & Andrea Ziefle, Motherhood, Labor Force Behavior, and Women’s 
Careers: An Empirical Assessment of the Wage Penalty for Motherhood in Britain, Germany, and the 
United States, 46 DEMOGRAPHY 341, 341 (2009).   
 165. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 137, at 3–4 (finding adult unpaid caregivers of 
children, primarily parents, provided, on average, nearly thirty hours a week of care; more than two-
fifths reported spending twenty-one hours a week or more; nearly three-quarters reported being the 
primary caregiver for the child and only a third reported that the child received paid help as well).   
 166. Id. at 4. 
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friends.”167  Not unexpectedly, many parents – most often mothers – reduce their 
time at work or leave work altogether.168  The lost income then becomes an added 
source of concern.169   
Reinterpreting the Act to reflect the usual tort rule described earlier would 
improve the economic outcome for the child and family.  Lower-income parents 
who leave work to care for the vaccinated child would be entitled to 
reimbursement for past and future income, at least to the extent that their lost 
wages do not exceed the amount a medically-trained person would be paid to 
provide caregiving services.170  The reimbursement would contribute to equity 
for lower-income families as compared with higher-income families whose 
payments for a substitute caregiver are already reimbursable.171  A preferable 
outcome would be reimbursement up to the amount of income actually lost, 
regardless of what would be paid to a substitute caregiver. 
 In the absence of a reinterpretation of compensation under the Act, lower 
income families lack reliable alternative sources of income to replace income 
lost when a parent reduces or terminates paid employment to care for their 
disabled child.172  Cash assistance under Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) is generally tied to a work requirement that closes the door to 
mothers exercising autonomy about whether a child should receive her care or 
 
 167. Id.  
 168. See id. at  8 (finding only a third of adult unpaid caregivers of special needs children report 
being employed full time at time of the survey; three-fourths reported a change in employment ranging 
from reducing hours through to giving up work entirely); HOGAN, supra note 118, at 36 (“[M]others of 
children with disabilities are less likely to return to the labor force within the first two years after their 
child is born, compared to mothers whose children do not have disabilities. What is important, however, 
is that even when their children have serious disabilities, most mothers eventually return to paid 
employment and work during a substantial portion of their children’s lives. … [B]y the time children are 
twelve years old, mothers are employed during 62 percent of children’s lives if there is no disability 
versus 56 percent for children with moderate limitations. For children with serious disabilities, mothers 
have still been employed during more than one-half (53 percent) of their children’s lives. While work 
delays are more likely after a child with a disability is born and subsequent interruptions in employment 
are more frequent, it is clear that many children with disabilities experience life in a home with a 
working mother.”). 
 169. See HOGAN, supra note 118, at 38–42. 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c); see Lerwick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 06-847V, 2014 
WL 3720309, at *13 (Fed. Cl. June 30, 2014), aff’d, 119 Fed. Cl. 745 (Fed. Cl. 2015) (explaining 
Congressional preference for home care in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(c)). 
 171. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 463, 513 n.190 (1998) (explaining that by allowing tort damages for a paid substitute caregiver but 
not for a parental caregiver discriminates against lower-income parents). 
 172. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 137, at 7 (finding over a quarter of unpaid adult 
caregivers of children experience a “high degree” of financial hardship, as compared with 13% of 
unpaid adult caregivers of adults); see generally Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study 
of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U L. REV. 515 (2013) 
(explaining how tax credits fail to provide a safety net for low-income families). 
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be placed with a paid caregiver.173  The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
entitles parents in covered jobs to a limited amount of unpaid time off to care for 
a sick child.174  Not only is the leave unpaid, it is also not indefinite since 
employers are not required to hold the job open for the duration of the child’s 
illness or disability.175  The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires 
employers to accommodate employees who leave work to care for a sick child, 
but only to the same degree that the employer accommodates other employees 
who experience a disability.176  If the employer provides no pay to employees to 
care for an ill family member, no pay is required for the parent who misses work 
to care for a vaccinated child.177  Unemployment insurance is usually unavailable 
if the child’s caregiving needs reduce the parent’s availability for employment.178  
Even within the family, if one parent leaves paid work to care for a couple’s 
child, the other parent has no obligation to provide additional funding in the form 
of alimony or child support.179  Medicaid is a rare exception because states are 
allowed to use Medicaid funding to provide compensation to parents who are 
caring for a disabled child.180  The amount of compensation is small, however, 
and usually covers a relatively small number of hours a week.181  
 
 173. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers’ 
Decisions about Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1029, 1030–31, 1040–41 
(2004) (examining “the impact of welfare reform on low-income women’s ability to make decisions 
about caregiving and paid employment”; identifying women’s economic freedom as recognition “that 
both caregiving and paid employment have economic value and affect women’s economic welfare. . . . 
Another way of rejecting the dichotomous thinking that characterizes work/caregiving debates is to 
enable low-income mothers to make their own decisions about whether and when to work inside and 
outside the home.”). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117.  
 175. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 
6381–6387; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (1994)); see Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the 
Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 146–48 (2003) (describing the FMLA and some of its limitations).   
 176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117;) see Williams & Segal, supra note 175, at 149–151 (describing the 
ADA and some of its limitations). 
 177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Marley S. Weiss, Commentary: Women’s Employment Rights in the Maryland Workplace 
Of 2007 and 2027, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & CLASS 63, 69–70 (2009) (explaining how 
unemployment benefits are typically skewed towards full time male employees).   
 179. See HOGAN, supra note 118, at 32–34 (finding higher rates of divorce and separation among 
parents with disabled children, with highest rates among parents of child with most severe disability); 
Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Chalimony: Seeking Equity Between Parents of Children with Disabling 
Conditions and Chronic Illnesses, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 270–73 (2010). 
 180. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.  
 181. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Disabled Kids and Their Moms: Caregivers and Horizontal 
Equity, 19 GEORGETOWN J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43, 59–65 (2012).  Some state programs provide 
more robust help for caregiving parents.  Id. In the case of Lerwick v. Secretary of Health and Hum. 
Servs., for example, Braden’s mother elected to use a state benefit to pay herself the hourly wage 
available for an unlicensed care provider. No. 06-847V, 2014 WL 3720309 (Fed. Cl. June 30, 2014), 
aff’d, 119 Fed. Cl. 745 (Fed. Cl. 2015). Initially, the benefit covered forty-four hours a week, but it was 
later reduced to thirty-six hours a week.  Id. at *2.  Based on the California State’s website, however, the 
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Whether a parent has enough income to support the family affects, without 
a doubt, family decisions about the provider, the quality, and the quantity of care 
a disabled child will receive, regardless of what may be optimal for the child.  As 
just described, in most situations involving disabled children, discrimination on 
the basis of family income is a given, because the system lacks any guarantee of 
financial security.  There is no indication that Congress intended to embed 
economic discrimination into the Act, however, and such discrimination is good 
reason to reject decisions denying compensation for lost wages.   
D.  Gendered Assumptions about Parenting 
Nearly three-quarters of the adults who provide unpaid care for a special-
needs child are women.182  Gender fairness for caregivers of disabled children 
could provide significant improvement to the lives of caregiving mothers and 
their children.  While meeting the needs of these mothers and children is a big 
agenda, providing compensation for lost wages under the Act is one useful step.   
Consider again the Riley case, where the court recognized the legitimacy of 
the father’s employment-related claim but rejected the mother’s claim.183  
Keith’s father wants to change jobs but worries that any new employer will refuse 
health insurance for the vaccinated child.184  The court says that the father’s 
employment preference should be respected, so the continuation of the father’s 
health insurance cannot determine the costs for medical care included in the 
compensation package.185  Keith’s mother leaves her paid work as a tax attorney 
for two years to provide Keith with the level of physical therapy that Keith’s 
doctor recommends.186  Her claim for lost wages is denied.187  Why is one claim 
accepted and one denied?  A possible but unacceptable explanation is that men 
are “supposed to be” providers, so a father’s employment opportunities must be 
protected for the sake of the child.  Women, by contrast, are “supposed to be” 
 
program no longer appears to authorize payments to parents for providing care for the child.  See In-
Home Supportive Services (IHSS) Program, CAL. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., https://www.cdss.ca.gov/ihss-for-
children (last visited June 18, 2020).   
 182. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 137, at 1 (finding 72% of caregivers are 
female).  Nearly half of the children who were not infants or toddlers required help with “activities of 
daily living” (ADLs) such as toileting, feeding, or getting in and out of bed. Id. at 2.  Most needed their 
adult caregiver to advocate for them, perform treatments or therapies, give medicines or injections, 
among other tasks.  Id. at 3.  On average, adult caregivers provided nearly thirty hours a week of care; 
more than two-fifths reported spending twenty-one hours a week or more. Id.  Nearly three-quarters 
reported being the primary caregiver for the child and only a third reported that the child received paid 
help as well. Id. at 4.   
 183. See generally Riley v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-466V, 1991 WL 
123583 (Fed. Cl. June 21, 1991) 
 184. Id. at *7. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at *11. 
 187. Id. (denying Mrs. Riley’s lost wages as an incurred expense because lost wages are considered 
a contribution rather than an expense).  
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homemakers, so the mother’s decision to forego paid work for caregiving is only 
appropriate and not cause for recognition.188  Further, a woman should be 
financially dependent on her husband, so he bears the burden of support; her lost 
opportunity to earn wages need not be compensable.189 
Gender stereotypes are more obvious in Riley, but they are not limited to 
that case.  In McCollum, the court criticized Grant’s father’s plan to take early 
retirement so he could participate more fully in Grant’s care.190  According to the 
court, Grant’s father was only doing his parental duty by caring for Grant.191  The 
court conveniently overlooks the fact that Grant was about to turn eighteen, and 
parents do not owe a legal duty of care to their adult children.  An alternative but 
unacceptable explanation for the court’s denial is gender stereotyping.  By 
undertaking caregiving, Grant’s father is refusing to fulfill his provider role and 
instead fulfilling a role more properly performed by a woman.192   
The McCollum court applies a second stereotypical norm when concluding 
that appropriate parenting means people who parent (usually female) should act 
altruistically and dedicate their lives to their children, regardless of the child’s 
age or needs, and regardless of the economic consequences to the parent and 
family.193  A parent with a disabled adult child like Grant has the same duty as 
 
 188. See Williams & Segal, supra note 175, at 94–98 (describing gender stereotyping as it affects 
women and men in the workplace). Not unsurprisingly, in light of economic stresses on families with 
seriously disabled children, “[t]hey more often adopt traditional relationships in which the mother is the 
primary caregiver and the father is the breadwinner.” HOGAN, supra note 118, at 46.  Gendered 
stereotyping about providers and homemakers is dying but hardly dead.  See Sawhill & Guyot, supra 
note 162 (“Many Americans continue to believe that men should be the primary breadwinners and that 
women should take care of home and family. For example, among high school seniors, 23 
percent believe that this model of men as breadwinners and women as homemakers is the most 
desirable. These beliefs affect both women’s aspirations and employers’ assumptions and thus women’s 
opportunities to get ahead”). 
 189. See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, 
the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 717, 744–45 (2000) (stating a mother’s lost opportunity costs are not compensable in tort not 
just because families were more likely to be dependent on father’s earnings but because “legislatures 
believed that widows and children ought to be dependent”); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First 
Women’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078, 
1183 (1994) (“women’s economic dependence on men was a condition imposed and enforced by law;” 
loss of wife’s labor was compensable in tort as loss to husband, not as a claim for wife’s share in 
property). 
 190. McCollum v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 86, 90–91 (Fed. Cl. 2010), aff’d per 
curiam, 412 Fed. Appx. 307 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Chamallas, supra note 171, at 469 (“Because devaluation affects the construction of 
categories, not simply individuals, men whose lives and activities follow ‘female’ patterns are also 
disadvantaged”); Williams & Segal, supra note 175, at 101–02; Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental 
Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1056–57 (1994).  
 193. See Williams & Segal, supra note 175, at 92–94 (describing “gold standard” ideal of 
motherhood); Chamallas, supra note 171, at 528 (“Until quite recently, the law placed no economic 
value on a homemaker’s domestic services, a category which encompasses not only cleaning the house, 
but also caring for children and other dependents.”).  
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the parent of an infant to provide physical care without compensation.  A similar 
expansive view of motherhood is found in Lerwick, where Braden sometimes 
experienced life-threatening seizures during the night.194  At the time of the 
hearing on compensation, when Braden was about ten years old, Braden’s mother 
woke up to check on him every two hours.195  According to the life-planning 
expert who testified about the kind of professional help Braden needed, the 
mother’s sleep interruptions were “extraordinary,” and she needed to be “able to 
sleep like regular people sleep, not wake up every hour and a half or two 
hours.”196  The Special Master disagreed.  According to him, “[p]eriodically, all 
children will wake their parents with various complaints.  Ms. Lerwick has not 
demonstrated that her experience with [Braden] at night is sufficiently out-of-
line with another parent’s nighttime care to support the need for a licensed nurse 
for all hours of the day.”197  
The court provided no source to support the assertion that ten-year-olds 
routinely need parental checks every two hours every night.  In my own 
experience as a parent, grandparent, and friend of many other parents, the 
moment when a baby sleeps through the night is cause for celebration because, 
up until then, parents have a hard time resuming pre-baby functioning.198  
Braden’s mother’s decade-long experience is, at the very least, extraordinary.  
The unspoken assumption of these cases is that mothers (and fathers who 
undertake the traditionally defined role of mother) should be all things at all times 
to their children.  No child, therefore, has unusual needs that may be beyond the 
scope of usual mothering.  Adherence to an all-encompassing and altruistic 
vision of motherhood obscures the unusual caregiving efforts of parents of 
children disabled due to vaccinations and, in the case of the Act, imposes 
financial costs on them that most parents do not experience.   
The gender stereotyping that characterizes cases under the Act denying 
parents compensation for lost wages is startling because, for at least a decade 
before the Act was adopted, courts and Congress were rejecting gender 
stereotyping in law.199  For example, in a series of cases beginning in 1971, the 
 
 194. Lerwick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 06-847V, 2014 WL 3720309, at *8 (Fed. Cl. 
June 30, 2014), aff’d, 119 Fed. Cl. 745, 746 (2015)  
 195. Id. at *6, *11.  
 196. Id. at *10. 
 197. Id. at *9. 
 198. See ADAM MANSBACH, GO THE FUCK TO SLEEP (2011). 
 199. Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law Institute 
Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child’s Best Interests, 35 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 474 (1999) (exploring gender bias issues in custody cases); Vicki 
Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1892–93 (2000) (diminishing impact of separate 
spheres ideology as it affects women’s employment); Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic 
Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 963–65 (2005) 
(examining the judicial rejection of gendered standards in child custody cases); see Witt, supra note 189, 
at 745 (examining changes in tort law in the twentieth century). 
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Supreme Court employed, for the first time, a heightened scrutiny standard under 
the Equal Protection Clause to test whether a law illegitimately failed to treat 
men and women equally.200  Congress, not long after, passed the Equal Rights 
Amendment and sent it to the states for ratification.201  Rejecting an interpretation 
that reifies gendered roles simply means interpreting the Act to reflect the 
growing movement toward gender-equality legal norms. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act validates a social norm that 
infectious diseases put everyone in the same boat.202  If one person decides to 
drill a hole in the bottom of the boat, everyone will drown, not just the driller.203  
Keeping vaccinations available is important to everyone, most particularly those 
who are vulnerable to the infectious disease but who are too fragile or too young 
to be vaccinated themselves.  A vanishingly small group of adults and children 
experience an adverse reaction after getting vaccinated, but some experience 
severe illness, disability, and even death.204  When Congress adopted legislation 
protecting vaccine manufacturers from liability for these adverse events, it 
created an alternative compensation program.  While the alternative program is 
not a complete alternative to the preexisting tort claim, most costs are covered.  
As a result of unsupportable interpretations of the compensation provisions of 
the Act, however, a key form of compensation is unavailable: relief for parents 
who experience financial losses when they leave work to care for a child 
experiencing a severe illness or disability after vaccination. 
 
 200. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (holding that denying financially self-
sufficient widowers Social Security benefits payable to self-sufficient widows violates equal protection 
and not justified by “assumptions as to dependency” that male workers’ earnings are vital to their 
families’ support, while female workers’ earnings do not significantly contribute to families’ support); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (holding that denying widower survivor’s benefits 
that are granted to widows violates equal protection; sex-based distinction not tolerated because based 
on an “archaic and overbroad” generalization that male workers’ earnings are vital to their families’ 
support, while female workers’ earnings do not significantly contribute to families’ support); Katharine 
T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 839–40 (1990) (“The shift began in 1971 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling on a challenge by Sally Reed to an Idaho statute that gave males 
preference over females in appointments as estate administrators.  Although the Court in Reed did not 
address the separate spheres ideology directly, it rejected arguments of the state that ‘men are as a rule 
more conversant with business affairs than . . . women,’ to find the statutory preference arbitrary and 
thus in violation of the equal protection clause. This decision was followed by a series of other 
successful challenges by women arguing that beneath the protective umbrella of the separate spheres 
ideology lay assumptions that disadvantage women in material, significant ways.”). 
 201. H.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972) (“Proposed Amendment to The Constitution of The United 
States”); Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal 
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). 
 202. JUDITH SCHINDLER & JUDY SELDIN-COHEN, RECHARGING JUDAISM 4 (2017). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
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This article explains the flaws in the legal reasoning applied by courts 
denying relief.205  Policy reasons also counsel against perpetuating the flawed 
interpretation.206  People denied equity include the children injured by vaccines 
as well as their mothers and fathers.  Rationales advanced by courts denying 
relief reinforce discrimination based on disability, vulnerability, and income as 
well as perpetuate outdated stereotypes about parenthood and gender.  It is time 
for this particular injustice to come to an end.  
 
 
 205. See supra Section I.  
 206. See supra Section II.  
